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Abstract
We show how a multi-agent simulator can support
two important but distinct methods for assessing
a trading strategy: Market Replay and Interactive
Agent-Based Simulation (IABS). Our solution is
important because each method offers strengths
and weaknesses that expose or conceal flaws in
the subject strategy. A key weakness of Market
Replay is that the simulated market does not sub-
stantially adapt to or respond to the presence of
the experimental strategy. IABS methods provide
an artificial market for the experimental strategy
using a population of background trading agents.
Because the background agents attend to market
conditions and current price as part of their strat-
egy, the overall market is responsive to the pres-
ence of the experimental strategy. Even so, IABS
methods have their own weaknesses, primarily
that it is unclear if the market environment they
provide is realistic. We describe our approach in
detail, and illustrate its use in an example applica-
tion: The evaluation of market impact for various
size orders.
1. Background and Related Work
Most professional investors, hedge funds, investment institu-
tions and banks prefer to test trading strategies in simulation
before “going live” with funds at risk. A key reason of
course is to gain assurance that the strategy is likely to
be profitable, or at least that it will not lose money. It is
worth pointing out that not all trading strategies are aimed
at producing profits from price moves, some strategies are
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aimed at minimizing the costs of a transaction. For instance,
a pension fund’s management may have concluded that it
should reduce its holdings in a particular stock and therefore
trigger a sell order for that asset. If this order were sent to
an exchange as a market sell order, the price would likely
fall significantly and provide the seller a lower average price
than they would hope. So brokerages and banks create exe-
cution (trading) strategies to minimize that impact, such as
discriminating a larger order across as set of smaller orders
over time. In general we would like to provide a robust
means for evaluating trading strategies. This motivates our
research.
Research Question: How can we leverage historical data
and Interactive Simulation to most effectively assess experi-
mental trading strategies?
In this paper we will examine two approaches to market sim-
ulation that can be used to evaluate an experimental strategy:
Market Replay and Interactive Simulation. Market Replay
is by far the most prevalent method. With Market Replay,
historical data is revealed to the experimental strategy as
simulated time advances. Market Replay in the literature is
often referred to as to this as backtesting. When the strategy
chooses to buy or sell at a particular time the backtester
executes the order at the current price, where the meaning
of “current price” varies with the sophistication of the back-
tester. We will describe a few such backtesting (or Market
Replay) techniques in section 2.2.
From an evaluation point of view, Market Replay has the
problem that the simulated market is not responsive to the
experimental trading strategy. For example, in a learning
trading strategy trained in Market Replay may learn to ex-
ploit specific price histories or conditions that would not
exist if the market did adapt or respond. It is possible that
the performance of a strategy refined in Market Replay may
be optimistic, and that it would not perform as well in a
“responsive” real market.
With Interactive Agent-based Simulation (IABS), an artifi-
cial market environment is created by populating the sim-
ulation with dozens or perhaps thousands of “background
agents.” Each background agent follows its own private,
perhaps randomized, strategy for placing buy and sell or-
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Figure 1. An example limit order book.
ders. The experimental strategy can then experience and
trade in this environment. Potential advantages of the IABS
approach include: that participating market agents will react
to the experimental strategy with different consequential
orders; that the experimental strategy can be exposed to
conditions and situations that may not have occurred histor-
ically; and that a much larger corpus of market data can be
engaged for strategy evaluation. Thus IABS may provide
a more comprehensive evaluation than would be possible
using only historical data.
1.1. Limit Order Books
We briefly review how public exchanges such as NASDAQ
and the New York Stock Exchange operate because they are
essential to our work. An exchange facilitates the buying
and selling of assets by accepting and satisfying buy and sell
orders. Order types are further distinguished between limit
orders and market orders. A limit order includes a price that
should not be exceeded in the case of a buy, or should not
be gone below in the case of a sell. A market order indicates
that the trader is willing to accept the best price available
immediately. Figure 1 shows the difference between limit
and market orders in terms of their interaction with the order
book (an exchange has an order book for each asset traded).
The limit order book (LOB) represents a snapshot of the
supply and demand for an exchange traded instrument at
a given time (see figure 1). It is an electronic record of all
the outstanding buy and sell limit orders organized by price
levels. The LOB is split into two sides; the ask and bid
sides containing all the sell and buy limit orders respectively.
The difference between the lowest ask price (best ask) and
highest bid price (best bid) is called “the spread.” The mid
price is the average of the best bid and ask prices. Finally,
“liquidity” refers to the ease of buying or selling without
a significant impact on the price of the instrument. Very
liquid instruments tend to have a tight spread with orders
arriving in sub microsecond intervals.
A matching engine is used to match incoming buy and sell
orders. This typically follows the price/time priority rule
(Nasdaq, 2019), whereby orders are ranked first according
to their price. Multiple orders having the same price are
then ranked according to the time they were entered. If the
price and time are the same for the incoming orders, then the
larger order gets executed first. The matching engine uses
the LOB to store pending orders that could not be executed
upon arrival. It is important to note that exchanges allow
for cancellations or partial cancellations of unmatched limit
orders which can lead to complex order book dynamics that
arise due to the frequency of these order cancellations. We
highlight this as part of the exploratory data analysis section
of this paper.
The dynamical properties of limit order books have enjoyed
significant coverage in the economics and statistical liter-
ature. The survey (Gould et al., 2013) provides a detailed
overview of order book models ranging from studies of auc-
tion dynamics resulting from interaction of informed and
uninformed traders (Kyle, 1985) to mathematical models
utilizing Poisson (Cont et al., 2010) and Hawkes processes
(Toke, 2011). (Lehalle & Laruelle, 2018) provides an in-
depth overview of market microstructure, focusing on topics
such as market design, order book dynamics, market impact
and the consequences of recent regulatory requirements on
market microstructure. The topic of market impact and opti-
mal liquidation strategies has been studied extensively in the
literature and are covered in (Bouchaud, 2010) and (Cont
et al., 2014). (Grinold & Kahn, 1995) covers the sigma-root-
liquidity model (square root law) which takes into account
the spread cost, daily volatility, daily volume and number
of traded shares to estimate market impact. However, this
only considers the size of the trade in relation to the daily
volume and does not consider other aspects such as how the
trade is executed and the rate at which the trades are placed.
A number of models exist in the literature which follow
the dynamics of the model proposed by (Grinold & Kahn,
1995). These include the continuous time propagator model
explained in (Gatheral, 2010) and the Alfonsi and Schied
order book model by (Alfonsi et al., 2010). In the continu-
ous time propagator model, the evolution of the stock price
is modelled using two functions with one describing the
instantaneous market impact and the second being a decay
kernel. In (Alfonsi et al., 2010), the authors show that an
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optimal liquidation strategy is bucket-shaped and would in-
volve placing two block of orders at the beginning and end
of the proposed trade duration with a constant rate of order
placement in-between.
1.2. Approaches to Backtesting
Backtesting a trading strategy allows for evaluating the per-
formance of a strategy in a simulated environment using
historical data. Backtesters have different levels of sophis-
tication. A simple form of a backtester would involve the
use of the mid price or the last traded price as the historical
price at which an evaluated strategy would execute. This
approach ignores the fact that in reality, the price at which
a trade is executed is not the mid price or historical price
but the prices available at the best bid or ask depending
on the direction of the trade. Another issue centers on the
assumption that the executed trade would not impact the
evolution of the historical prices. Therefore, a more sophis-
ticated backtesting approach would implement some form
of a market impact model that would take into consideration
the size of the trade among other variables to account for
their effect on the historical prices. In our experiments, we
implement a backtester using a market replay mechanism
that does present the experimental strategy with some mar-
ket impact as a consequence of sizeable orders, thus partially
overcoming the issues described with static historical data.
1.3. Interactive Multi Agent-based Simulation
Agent-based modeling of complex systems involves repre-
senting each of the constituent participants of the system as
an autonomous agent. These agents are designed to act and
interact with one another in ways intended to lead to their
aggregate behaviour approximating the modeled complex
system. Such modeling has been applied to the study of
financial markets, with market participants represented as
agents trading in an artificial simulated market. Different
types of traders and their various strategies can be separately
modeled as agents and allowed to interact within the con-
fines of the simulated market with the resulting dynamics
intended to accurately reproduce a typical trading period in
the market. Indeed certain stylized empirical facts and well
known statistical regularities of financial markets such as the
heavy-tailed distribution of asset returns, and volatility clus-
tering (Cont, 2001), have been shown to emerge in such an
agent-based simulation setting (Preis et al., 2006). See also,
(Paddrik et al., 2012) where agent-based modeling is used
as a test-bed to test hypothesized causes of the 2010 ‘Flash
Crash’ phenomenon. A rich source of references on agent-
based modeling techniques applied to the study of market
dynamics in agent-based setting is (LeBaron, 2006). (Wang
& Wellman, 2017) demonstrates an agent-based simulation
of a market made up of what they refer to as Heuristic Be-
lief Learning agents. They show that such agents can be
used to manipulate prices in such a market through spoof-
ing, demonstrating the efficacy of using these agent-based
approaches to understand such behaviours in real markets.
1.4. Zero Intelligence Agents
In our studies discussed below, we populate our IABS with
hundreds of simple agents, referred to as “Zero Intelligence”
or ZI agents. The term zero intelligence agent was coined by
(Gode & Sunder, 1993) to describe a family of automated
market participants that submit random bid and ask orders.
In this seminal work, two types of agents were considered:
ZI-U (unconstrained) agents which place orders entirely at
random within fixed extents, and ZI-C (constrained) agents
which are prohibited from placing orders that result in an im-
mediate loss. These ZI agents were initially used to demon-
strate that the allocative efficiency of a market arises from
its structure and not the particular strategy or intelligence of
its participants, i.e., individual strategies are subsumed by
the market as whole.
Subsequent use of ZI agents focused on the separation of
market structure from participant strategy to allow isolated
analysis of structural components. For example, Bollerslev
and Domowitz (Bollerslev & Domowitz, 1993) use a set
of ZI agents to analyze the structural impact of restricting
the maximum depth of an order book. Over time, the “pure
random” aspect of ZI agents was relaxed to produce, for
example, “near zero intelligence” agents which use recent
mean transaction prices to study asset price bubbles and
crashes (Duffy & U¨nver, 2006) and “zero intelligence plus”
agents which maintain a value belief based on the recent
order stream to improve market convergence under certain
conditions (Cliff & Bruten, 1997).
Modern market simulations often use some form of ZI agent
as a “background” agent to produce a reasonable baseline
market microstructure into which experimental agents can
be injected. For example, Wang and Wellman’s investigation
of spoofing agents (Wang & Wellman, 2017) uses a modified
ZI agent with a Bayesian fundamental value belief based
on noisy observations of an oracular value series, a private
valuation per agent per unit, and a “strategic parameter” η
(eta) that controls the agent’s willingness to accept less than
its desired surplus in exchange for immediate, guaranteed
execution.
For further information on the history of zero intelligence
agents in agent-based computational economics, see the
excellent review by Dan Ladley (Ladley, 2012).
1.5. The ABIDES Interactive Agent-Based Simulator
In this section, we refer to the ABIDES simulation frame-
work (Byrd et al., 2019) with an obfuscated name and ci-
tation for the sake of peer review anonymity. After peer
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review, references to ABIDES will be replaced with the
proper framework name and the real citation will be in-
cluded.
Both our backtesting and interactive simulation experiments
utilize the open-source ABIDES framework, which provides
an agent-based interactive discrete event simulator to sup-
port such investigations. The ABIDES simulation platform
provides support for continuous double-auction trading with
nanosecond resolution, the ability to simulate specific dates
in history either as a pure replay backtesting or with gated
agent access to noisy historical data, simulation of variable
electronic network latency and agent computation delays,
and a requirement that all agents intercommunicate solely
through a standardized message protocol similar to that
used by NASDAQ. It also provides a hierarchy of herita-
ble trading agent and exchange classes that facilitate rapid
deployment of new experimental ideas.
We leverage ABIDES’s ability to take the same historical
market data, exchange agents, and trading agents and eas-
ily perform a head-to-head comparison of non-interactive
backtesting results against interactive agent-based results.
For the current set of experiments, we compare historical
backtesting to a population of zero intelligence (ZI) agents
that make noisy observations of a stochastic mean-reverting
process as the fundamental value of a single equity. The
historical backtest operates at real-world time scale and
the agents based on the mean-reverting process operate in
discrete time units.
2. Approach
2.1. Backtesting in Agent-based Simulation
One contribution of this paper is that we show how one
can support sophisticated backtesting within an agent-based
simulation using market replay. In particular, we imple-
ment backtesting using three agents: An exchange agent
representing the exchange which keeps the order book (e.g.,
Nasdaq or NYSE), a market replay agent that provides
liquidity by replaying historical orders and an experimental
agent representing the trading strategy to be evaluated. As
an example application, we investigate the impact of placing
buy and sell market orders at different times and sizes to
evaluate the short and long-term impacts on the mid price.
The market replay agent uses real historical intra-day order
data to replicate the evolution of the order book for a par-
ticular day. For our experiments, we used an order stream,
implemented as a message stream, containing a record of
orders placed at different times. Each order is characterized
by the time it was placed, the direction, size, price and or-
der type (submissions, cancellations, partial cancellations,
visible and hidden executions). The data was provided by
LOBSTER (Huang & Polak, 2011).
The messages file contained 86,615 events representing all
the different order types submitted between 09:30 and 10:30
with 41,844 unique order IDs. In terms of new limit order
submissions, there were 22,222 sell limit orders and 19,333
buy limit orders. The average time between the 41,554
new limit order arrivals was 866 ms and the average time
between the 38,791 cancellation and partial cancellation
order arrivals was 928 ms. As part of our analysis, we
visualize the evolution of the order book for all price levels
and plot the price-level volume chart in figure 2.
Figure 2. Price-level volume plot. Black line represents the mid
price, Each point is the price at different price levels with the
colour scheme indicating the size (log scale) present at each level
At the first time stamp available after the market opens, the
historical order book file is referenced by the market re-
play agent to generate a list of new limit orders necessary
to replicate the opening order book. This is needed as the
orders stream does not contain the orders that led to the
construction of the first order book snapshot. The submitted
orders are handled by the exchange agent which uses an
order book implementation and matching engine to update
the order book based on the submitted and matched orders.
After market open, the orders stream are processed sequen-
tially and the orders are submitted to the exchange agent
as simulated time reaches the time stamp associated with
each historical order. Given that the orders stream contains
visible and hidden execution messages, these had to be ac-
counted for by either cancelling or partially cancelling the
corresponding unfilled orders in the order book.
The experimental agent is configured to participate in the
simulation in a manner similar to the market replay agent,
with the orders submitted dependant on the experiment car-
ried out.
2.2. Event Studies
As part of our methodology for evaluating experimental
strategies, we leverage event studies. Event studies are so
called because of their utility in analyzing the effect of a
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(a) Experimental agent places buy order (b) Experimental agent places sell order
Figure 3. Observed impact on the mid price by the experimental agent placing market orders at twice the best bid or ask size
specific temporally-located event or class of events on a
series of measures, such as the price quotes of an equity se-
curity. There is a long history of event studies in economics
and finance as related in Craig MacKinlay’s excellent 1997
survey (Craig MacKinlay, 1997), which traces their use to
at least 1933.
The general procedure to conduct an event study is as fol-
lows, with examples given at each step. First, obtain a list
of event times either exogenously or endogenously: for ex-
ample identifying when news sources broke stories about
executive indictments, or by computing the times at which
an equity price series fell below some periodic moving av-
erage. Second, “cut out” periods of the measure series in
a window from shortly before to some time after each oc-
currence of the event: for example one day before to ten
days after news breaks of corporate wrongdoing. Third,
align those subseries at the time of each event; for example
placing each event at relative time zero, with negative X
axis indicating times prior to the event. Fourth, normalize
each subseries to be relative to a benchmark level at the
time of the event; for example dividing each equity price
subseries by the price at the time of event, so all prices
at “time zero” are exactly 1 and deviations from that price
indicate cumulative returns from the event time. Finally,
combine the subseries event examples using an appropriate
statistical or visual method to obtain some aggregated sense
of the effect of the event on the measure series; for example,
compute and visualize the mean and standard deviation of
the set of normalized equity price subseries to understand
the likely impact of a new occurrence of the event.
The event study is one of our primary tools to study the
effect of the experimental “impact trader” in our current
analysis. We define the entry of the impact trader into the
market to be the event and analyze across many different
trials (times, dates, trade sizes) the “typical” effect of a
single large trade on near-future price quotes for the same
equity.
3. Backtester Market Impact Experiments
The market impact studies take the form of a single experi-
mental agent placing orders against the market replay agent
providing liquidity during the simulation. In particular, we
carry out two experiments: In the first experiment we eval-
uate the impact of a large market buy order by having the
experimental agent place a buy order sized at 200% of the
best ask size. The bid/ask midpoint is recorded before and
after the order and used in the analysis. The experiment is
repeated 100 times at different times of day, with the result-
ing data combined into a single event study. We repeated
the same process for sell orders.
The time range chosen for this experiment was between
09:45:00 and 09:53:15 with orders placed every 5 seconds
providing 200 simulations in total (100 buys and 100 sells).
Each simulation is run separately, with the experimental
agent placing the orders within the time range chosen. This
is to allow for assessing the impact on the mid price without
any impact caused by other order placements. In subsequent
experiments, we follow a similar setup. However, we vary
the order sizes placed by the experimental agent. The time
range chosen for this experiment was between 09:45:00 and
09:46:35 with orders placed every 5 seconds providing 40
simulations for each order size and 160 simulations in total
for the order sizes chosen. The sizes are 50%, 200%, 300%
and 1000% of the best ask or bid sizes.
We analyze the market impact by considering the mid price
How to Evaluate Trading Strategies: Single Agent Market Replay or Multiple Agent Interactive Simulation?
(a) Experimental agent places buy order (b) Experimental agent places sell order
Figure 4. Observed impact on the mid price by the experimental agent placing market orders at 50%, 200%, 300% and 1000% of the best
bid or ask size
movement directly after the experimental agent order place-
ment. We compare that against the baseline associated with
the market replay agent placing orders without the presence
of an experimental agent. In order to evaluate the different
price impacts, we sample the price midpoints every 1 ms
and normalize by the mid price associated with the market
replay agent only. We then take the mean and standard
deviation of the different simulations to produce figure 3
showing the results of the first and second experiments and
figure 4 showing the results of the subsequent experiments.
For the first two experiments, we observe an immediate
spike in the mid price followed by a decay converging to-
wards the original mid price observed without the presence
of an experimental agent.
In figure 3(a), we show the relative mid price 10 seconds and
60 seconds before and after the 100 market buy order place-
ment times respectively. We also plot the standard deviation
as a band around the mean to gain a good understanding of
the different aggregated simulations. For the time range cho-
sen, we observe an increase in the mid price in the form of a
spike in the relative mean mid prices at the order placement
times. This is expected given the nature of the market orders
and how they remove the resting limit orders at the best ask
levels. The relative mean mid price does not converge in our
plots due to the time range chosen. However, when we look
beyond 60 seconds after the orders placement, we observe
that the mean mid price eventually converges. Similarly,
in figure 3(b), we show the relative mid price 10 seconds
and 60 seconds before and after 100 the market sell order
placement times respectively. We observe a similar profile
with the mid price decreasing and then converging over time.
However, the rate of convergence is higher in the case of
sell orders compared to buy orders. Another observation is
around the standard deviation around the relative mean mid
price whereby that of the sell market orders is narrower than
that of the buy market orders. Finally, we note the presences
of periodic relative mean mid price movements in the shape
of pulses occurring after the convergence time stamp.
In figure 4(a), we show the relative mid price 1 second
and 10 seconds before and after the 80 market buy order
placement times respectively. Clearly, the profiles associ-
ated with orders of higher sizes display higher increased
mid prices and relatively longer time to converge. Interest-
ingly, the mean-mid price associated with the experimental
agent placing orders at 50% of the best ask size results in
a slight decrease in the relative mid price which eventually
converges. Similarly, in figure 4(b), we show the relative
mid price 1 second and 10 seconds before and after the 80
market sell order placement times respectively. Again, the
profiles associated with orders of higher sizes display lower
decreased mid prices and relatively longer time to converge.
We also note a similar pattern to that observed in figure 4(a)
whereby the mean-mid price associated with the experimen-
tal agent placing orders at 50% of the best bid size results
in a slight increase in the relative mid price.
4. IABS Market Impact Experiments
For this series of experiments, following the approach taken
by others using evaluations with ZI agents, the interactive
market simulation was configured to proceed in discrete
time units with 1,000 total time units per simulation. (In
future work we intend to adapt ZI agents to continuous time
markets.) Each agent arrived at the market according to
a Poisson process, thus not every agent could act within
every time unit. The exchange processed messages at each
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(a) Experimental agent places buy order (b) Experimental agent places sell order
Figure 5. Observed impact on the mid price by the experimental agent placing market orders with greed = 1.0
time unit, with messages in the same time unit handled
in arbitrary order. A single equity was available to trade.
Its fundamental value sequence, which we think of as the
unobservable true consensus value of the equity, was taken
to be a stochastic mean-reverting process. Participating
agents received noisy observations of this fundamental value
at each market arrival.
The experimental agent in this study is the “impact agent”
which places a large, single order into the market at a par-
ticular time, with size determined by available liquidity and
a “greed” parameter. The background agent population
engaged to study market impact consists of 100 zero intel-
ligence (ZI) agents which randomly decide to buy or sell
at market arrival, then select a limit price chosen to pro-
duce a specific requested surplus to the agent if successfully
transacted. The requested surplus extents are a strategic
parameter that varies among the agent population, as is the
strategic threshold η (eta) as per Wang and Wellman’s con-
struction (Wang & Wellman, 2017). Our ZI agents maintain
a Bayesian belief about the current fundamental value and
current error, and use this to estimate the final fundamental
value as their anchor point for considering expected surplus.
The simulation is carefully constructed such that given
the same global random seed, every background agent
will receive the same random number sequence whether
or not the experimental agent is present. Deviations in
background agent behavior should therefore arise from
experimentally-altered market conditions and not simple
random perturbation of their decision processes. Given this
feature, each instance of simulation was conducted twice in
an experimental-control pair using the same global random
seed, once with the experimental impact agent trading as
designed, and once with the impact agent present but not
actually placing its “impactful” order. The difference, at
each discrete time unit, in the bid-ask midpoint between the
experimental trial and the control is considered the “impact”
of the experimental trader at that time unit.
In the simulation experiment, the experimental agent places
the “impact order” at time unit t = 200 in a simulation
of 1,000 time units duration. Each background ZI agent
first arrives at the market in the range t ∈ [0, 100] and then
following a Poisson process. Thus the equity order book
will be well populated by the time of the impact event. The
impact agent queries the exchange for liquidity data in the
form of price levels and aggregated volumes near the spread.
It uses a strategic “greed” parameter to determine what
size order to place relative to the available liquidity. In the
visualized experiment, the impact agent queries liquidity
within 1% of the inside bid (if selling) or ask (if buying) and
with greed = 1.0 places an order to capture all of it.
The current simulation configuration operates in arbitrary
discrete time units. For the sake of comparison with the
backtest, we capture impact from 100 units before each
event (T − 100) to 600 units after each event (T + 600),
and we consider each arbitrary time unit to represent 100
milliseconds.
We conducted 100 experimental-control trials (200 distinct
simulations) as described above and aggregated the results
in the form of an event study examining the effect of the
impact order on subsequent bid-ask quote midpoints. We
compute the aggregated effect of the impact order as the
percent change between each trial’s control price series and
experimental price series and visually present the mean
and standard deviation of those changes in Figure 5. We
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(a) Experimental agent places buy order (b) Experimental agent places sell order
Figure 6. Observed impact on the mid price by the experimental agent placing market orders with varying greed
conducted a similar set of trials while varying the impact
agent’s greed parameter and present the mean observed
impact by greed in Figure 6.
We note that in the interactive agent based simulation, the
experimental mean price does not return to the baseline
price, for which we offer three explanations.
First, even if our background ZI traders did not alter their
subsequent actions based on the impact trade (as the backtest
obviously does not), the makeup of the order book is now
different with regions near the spread substantially thinned
out and unavailable for trading. This means orders that
may have immediately executed (against volume “stolen”
by the impact trader) will now enter the order book instead.
However, as the ZI agents cancel all outstanding orders upon
each market arrival anyway, this would explain only very
short term effects until all ZI agents had again arrived at the
market.
Second, the ZI agents offered limit prices are computed
in part on a private value vector representing each agent’s
unique valuation of each unit of stock (with diminishing
returns). Because the impact agent has executed trades that
were not executed in the control, the ZI agents’ holdings
will have changed, causing different individual valuations
for acquiring additional shares.
Third, even if the ZI agents did not select different limit
prices to offer, the presence of their strategic parameter eta
(η) can cause them to trade at the current simulated spread
instead of their desired limit price, giving up some surplus
for guaranteed, immediate execution. Thus a change in the
inside bid-ask quotes can alter their behavior.
As illustrated by the simulation experiments, the ability of
market participant agents to react to the event allows the
market to reach a new, different equilibrium that could not
be realized in the backtest environment.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown how an existing Interactive Agent-based
Simulation market environment can be adapted for use
as a backtester. This approach enables the same candi-
date/experimental trading strategy to be evaluated in a back-
testing context as well as in an IABS context. To illustrate
the process and to investigate differences in outcomes, we
evaluated a very simple experimental trading agent, namely
one that enters a single, large market order. We use the
event study methodology to evaluate and compare the price
impact caused by this order.
We had not mentioned it before, but we should point out
that it is not feasible in a real market to conduct experiments
that definitively evaluate the impact of orders on the market:
We can never know how the market would have proceeded
without the experimental order being present. As such, it
is difficult to know for certain which of the two methods
we explored provides a more realistic background for eval-
uation. However, the consensus in the literature indicates
that substantial orders cause an initial “shock” impact with
a gradual decay. Some models suggest that in some cases
the effect is permanent, and the price will never revert to the
baseline. (Alfonsi et al., 2010).
We observe in our experiments that in the backtesting envi-
ronment the price trends rather quickly back to the baseline
price, eventually reaching that price and remaining there for
the sell experiments. In the backtesting buy experiments,
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the price trends towards, but does not stabilize at the base-
line price. In the IABS experiments, however, we see the
price stabilize at a new level in each set of experiments, sug-
gesting that the impact of the order is longer lasting or even
permanent. This corresponds more closely with existing
impact models and it makes sense because the ZI agents
acting as background traders do maintain state that can be
permanently affected by a market event and modify their
future behavior.
It is not clear at this stage that one approach is certainly bet-
ter than the other, but this paper shows that both evaluation
techniques can be pursued in the context of a single IABS
framework. We hope to continue our work on this testbed.
Our results suggest a number of questions to explore soon.
Among other things, we hope to extend the realism and di-
versity of background trading agents for IABS. A first step
in that direction will be to break away from our implemen-
tation of ZI traders that requires a fixed time step approach
to support continuous time markets.
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